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Abstract
Two-part pricing (the Netix model) has recently been proposed instead of uniform pricing
for pharmaceuticals. Under two-part pricing the health plan pays a xed fee for access to a
drug at unit prices equal to marginal costs. Despite two-part pricing being socially e¢ cient, we
show that the health plan is worse o¤ when the drug producer is a monopolist, as all surplus
is extracted. This result is reversed with competition, as two-part pricing yields higher patient
utility and lower drug costs for the health plan. However, if we allow for exclusive contracts,
uniform pricing is preferred by the health plan.
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1 Introduction
Pharmaceutical rms need to make large, up-front investments in drug discovery and clinical trials
before new drugs can be approved and launched in the market. To stimulate such investments,
pharmaceutical rms are granted patent protection, which in many cases gives rise to market
power. Although market power is deliberately granted, and intended to allow pharmaceutical rms
to charge higher prices over a given period of time, controversies over excessive prices are common.
New life-extending drugs for cancer treatment, orphan drugs that target rare but severe diseases,
and new HIV drugs are examples of drugs that have come under scrutiny for very high prices.1
Inducing innovation by allowing rms to charge high prices for new drugs runs the risk of
reducing access to new treatments in spite of relatively low variable costs of production. This
illustrates the familiar trade-o¤ between static and dynamic e¢ ciency. Public health plans in
di¤erent countries try to mitigate supply-side market power by employing various price control
mechanisms, such as direct regulation of drug prices (price caps) or regulation of the reimbursement
level (reference pricing). To what extent price controls curtail market power, though, depends on
the availability of close substitutes and documented treatment e¤ects. Drugs that o¤er substantial
health improvements will often be able to charge higher prices within such regulatory frameworks.
Recently, new drug pricing mechanisms, referred to as the Netix model applied to pharma-
ceuticals, have been proposed to decouple the utilisation of a new drug from payments that allow
recoupment of the rms development costs. Instead of paying a price per package, the health plan
negotiates a xed amount (access or subscription fee) in exchange for unlimited prescription vol-
ume. Australia has adopted this approach to providing antivirals (DAAs) to patients with hepatitis
C virus. According to Moon and Erikson (2019), the Australian authority negotiated an agreement
to spend approximately 1 billion Australian dollars over 5 years to get unlimited access to the
drugs. Two states in the US, Louisiana and Washington, have recently adopted similar purchasing
strategies for the same class of drugs.2
As a two-part tari¤, the so-called Netix model has the intuitive advantages of giving access to
the individual customers at very low marginal cost for the health plan without preventing suppliers
from proting from valuable innovations. Translating these e¤ects into pharmaceutical markets,
however, requires attention to specic institutional characteristics, including decisions made by
1See Mailankody and Prasad (2016).
2See https://www.gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm/newsroom/detail/2031 and https://www.hca.wa.gov/assets/program/hep-
c-elimination-gov-directive-18-13-nal.pdf
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health plans and competition between suppliers of drugs that target the same group of patients.
In this paper, we compare the performance of two-part tari¤s and uniform prices, both from the
health plans and drug producerspoint of view. We model a market for on-patent prescription
drugs that is served either by a monopolist or by two di¤erent producers supplying therapeutically
substitutable drugs. A drug producer can only gain access to the market if the health plan is willing
to sign a contract with this producer, and these contractual decisions determine which drugs can
be prescribed by physicians a¢ liated with the health plan.
Since the health plan can sign a contract with both drug suppliers, this is not a pure competition
for the market. With both suppliers signed up, their market shares will depend on (unit) prices
and the drugstreatment e¤ect (i.e., the drugsvertical and horizontal characteristics). When the
quality di¤erence between the two drugs is su¢ ciently large, turning the high-quality supplier into
a de facto monopolist, we conrm the well-known property of two-part tari¤s: The price charged
per prescription equals marginal costs and the xed fee extracts the entire surplus of the health
plan. Although two-part tari¤s ensure e¢ cient access to the drug, the health plan prefers uniform
pricing if therapeutic competition is out of reach.
Once we introduce therapeutic competition between the two suppliers, there is a striking change
in the health plans preference ranking of the two payment schemes. The reason for this is two-
fold. First, with therapeutic competition, the credible threat of excluding one of the drugs from
the health plan protects the plan against the aggressive surplus extraction when the drug producer
is a monopolist. Second, two-part tari¤s eliminate an allocative ine¢ ciency that is present under
monopoly pricing. Although di¤erent patented drugs belong to the same therapeutic class, they
are not perfect substitutes. Marginal cost pricing associated with two-part tari¤s ensures that the
individual patients are allocated to the best drug, taking into account both treatment e¤ects and
costs. With uniform pricing, the allocation of patients between the two drugs is distorted since the
rm with highest quality can exploit its demand advantage by setting a higher price.
The two-part tari¤ scheme (so-called Netix model) therefore improves access to high-quality
drugs, in line with its advocacy among policymakers. The distribution of surplus, however, crucially
depends on the competition regime. Drug suppliers tend to prefer uniform pricing under therapeutic
competition, and two-part tari¤s under monopoly, which is the exact opposite of the ranking of
payment regimes by the health plan. Thus, if we consider a game in which the health plan is
given the power to determine the type of payment scheme at the outset, the subgame perfect Nash
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equilibrium would have two-part tari¤s only in the presence of (su¢ ciently strong) therapeutic
competition. This conclusion relies on the assumption that the health plan will include all drugs
that contributes to increasing its surplus. However, in an extension to the main analysis we show
that if we include the possibility of exclusive contracts, where only one of the drugs is included in
the health plan, then uniform pricing is always weakly preferred by the purchaser.
Our study builds on, and bridges, two di¤erent strands of literature. On the one side, we employ
a standard theoretical framework applied to pharmaceutical markets for studying price competition
and regulatory policies under imperfect competition. Due to heterogeneity among patients and
di¤erences in quality and the workings of di¤erent drugs, models combining horizontal and vertical
di¤erentiation have been useful in capturing important features of pharmaceutical markets, both
demand-side and supply-side characteristics (see for example Brekke et al. (2007), Miraldo (2009),
Bardey et al. (2010), Bardey et al. (2016), Brekke et al. (2016) and Gonzàles et al. (2016)).
Among these, the general set-up in our paper relates most closely to the spatial formulation in
Brekke et al. (2007) and Miraldo (2009).
The novel contribution of our paper in relation to this strand of literature is two-fold. First, we
introduce two-part pricing into this framework, whereas previous studies focus solely on uniform
pricing. As we will show, two-part pricing not only changes the drug producerspricing decisions
(including unit prices), but indeed also the intensity of competition among the producers. Second,
we allow for the health plan to decide on market access of one or both of the drugs, implying that
drug producers compete both for the market and on the market. Both elements implies a radical
change in equilibrium outcomes compared to the standard models.
On the other side, our paper builds on the strand of literature that focuses on two-part tari¤s.
Since the seminal paper by Oi (1971), two-part pricing contracts are known for allowing a monop-
olist to sell goods at marginal cost, but to still extract consumer surplus in the form of an upfront
payment. There is a large literature on price discrimination, including two-part tari¤s, in oligopoly
markets, with early contributions going back to Stole (1996), Armstrong and Vickers (2001), and
Yin (2004). These models focus on two-part pricing at consumer level and do not deal with the
specicities of pharmaceutical markets.3 Lakdawalla and Sood (2009, 2013) consider two-part pric-
ing in health care markets. Health insurance, both public and private, implies that consumers pay
3 In a setting where di¤erent producers sell to a common retailer, potential pro-competitive e¤ects of two-part
tari¤s have been identied by Gabrielsen and Sørgard (1998) and Cachon and Kök (2010). These e¤ects are similar
in nature to the ones identied in the present analysis, although the institutional setting is very di¤erent.
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upfront premiums in exchange for lower unit prices (co-payments) in the event of illness. Assuming
that insured consumersdemand for drugs is a function of the co-payments (in addition to their
health status and income), they show that health insurance eliminates the deadweight loss from
market power in health care provision, including pharmaceuticals. Our paper focuses on a di¤erent
issue, namely two-part pricing at health plan level instead of consumer level. This topic is con-
ceptually di¤erent, and allows us to study the game between drug producers and health plans in
terms of market access and inclusion of drugs in the health plan. To the best of our knowledge, this
represents the rst attempt to derive properties of two-part tari¤s, when applied by health plans
in paying for pharmaceuticals. Our aim is to study the e¤ect on two-part pricing on the health
plans access decision and the corresponding distribution of surpluses across drug producers and
the health plan. This is a highly relevant issue both for public and private health plans.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In
Section 3 we compare uniform pricing and two-part tari¤s in the case where the market is served
by a monopolist. Therapeutic competition is then introduced in Section 4, where we make the
same comparison of pharmaceutical pricing schemes when the market is (potentially) served by
the producers of two therapeutically substitutable drugs. In Section 5 we extend the analysis
of therapeutic competition to include the possibility of exclusive contracting by the health plan.
Finally, Section 6 provides a discussion and some concluding remarks.
2 Model
Consider a therapeutic market where either one or two on-patent prescription drugs are available
for patients. If there is only one drug in the market, it is located at one of the endpoints of a unit
line. If there are two drugs in the market, they are located at di¤erent endpoints of the same line;
drug 1 at the left endpoint and drug 2 at the right endpoint. Patients are uniformly distributed on
the line with total patient mass equal to one. We can interpret the unit line as a disease space
where a patients therapeutic benet of a particular drug is higher the closer the patient is located
to the drug, all else equal. Thus, the distance between the location of a particular drug and the
location of a particular patient reects the degree of therapeutic mismatch between the two.
Each patient attends a physician who prescribes what is considered the most appropriate treat-
ment for the patient, which is either one unit of a drug from the available choice set, or no drug
treatment. When making this decision, the prescribing physician takes into account both the pa-
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tients health benet and the price(s) of the drug(s). More specically, let vi > 0, pi > 0 and
zi 2 f0; 1g denote the quality, price and therapeutic location, respectively, of drug i, where i = 1; 2.
If one unit of this drug is prescribed to a patient located at x 2 [0; 1], the utility assigned to this
choice by the prescribing physician is
ui (x) = vi   t jx  zij   pi: (1)
For each patient, the physician will prescribe the drug that yields the highest utility, as specied
by (1), but only if this utility is non-negative. Otherwise, no drug treatment is given.
The utility function given by (1) consists of two components. The rst component is the patients
health benet of being prescribed drug i, which is given by vi t jx  zij. The health benet depends
on the quality of the drug and the therapeutic match between the patient and the drug, where the
relative importance of the latter is reected by the mismatch cost parameter t > 0.4 Notice that,
in case of two available drugs in the prescription choice set, t also measures (inversely) the degree
of therapeutic substitutability, and thus the intensity of therapeutic competition, between the two
drugs.






measures how sensitive the physicians prescription decision is to drug prices. In the
special case of  = 1, the physician takes drug prices fully into account and acts as a perfect
agent for a third-party purchaser (i.e., the health plan) that maximises total health benets net of
purchasing costs. However, in the more general case of  < 1, health benets are more important
than drug prices for the prescribing physician. In order to ensure equilibrium existence throughout
our analysis, we impose a lower bound on  equal to one half. Notice that our interpretation of 
is su¢ ciently general to incorporate patient copayments, where a higher copayment rate implies a
higher value of .5
Each drug is produced by a prot-maximising rm. The payment for drug i includes the per-
unit price pi and potentially also a xed fee fi, depending on the type of payment contracts used.
4The mismatch cost can be interpreted as the subjective e¤ectiveness of the drug therapy for a given patient,
including also possible side-e¤ects of the drug that are specic to the patient.
5Consider a patient located at x who is prescribed drug i and pays pi, where  2 (0; 1) is the copayment rate. The
utility associated with this prescription choice is vi pi  t jx  zij from a patient perspective and vi  pi  t jx  zij
from a third-party purchaser perspective. If the prescribing physician maximises a weighted average of patient utility
and purchaser utility, with a weight  given to the latter, the resulting physician payo¤ function is identical to (1)
for  :=  (1  ) + , implying that  is increasing in the copayment rate () and in the weight given to purchaser













Assuming a constant marginal cost c of drug production, equal for both drugs, the prot of producer
i is given by
i = (pi   c) yi + fi; (2)
where yi is the demand for drug i, which is derived from drug prescription decisions that maximise
(1) for each patient.
The available number of drugs in the market is determined by a monopoly purchaser (health
plan) who decides whether to include one or both of the drugs in its health plan. The objective of
the health plan is to maximise its surplus, dened as total health benets to patients net of drug
expenditures. If only drug i is included in the plan, the surplus is given by












is the total health benet of drug i, and where the market is partially (fully) covered if yi < (=) 1.
If both drugs are included, and there is viable competition between them, implying that the market
is fully covered, the surplus is





(v1   tx) dx+
Z 1
y1
(v2   t (1  x)) dx = v1y1 + v2 (1  y1) 
t
2
(1  2 (1  y1) y1) (6)
is the total health benet of including both drugs in the health plan.
Finally, we impose two parameter restrictions:
A1 min fv1; v2g > c+ t:
A2 jv1   v2j < 3t
The rst assumption states that the net health benet (health benet minus production cost) of
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each drug is positive for all patients in the market. This implies that the socially e¢ cient outcome
is a fully covered market, where each patient is given drug treatment, regardless of whether the
prescription choice set consists of one or two drugs. Another implication of this assumption is that
there is a monotonic relationship between total health benet and total welfare, dened as total
health benet net of production costs. The second assumption applies to the case of therapeutic
competition analysed in Section 4, ensuring that the quality di¤erence between the two drugs is
su¢ ciently low to ensure equilibrium existence under both payment schemes considered, when both
drugs are included in the health plan. Given the above assumptions, we consider the following game:
1. The drug producers simultaneously and non-cooperatively submit bids (pi; fi).
2. The purchaser decides whether to include one or both of the drugs in the health plan (or
none of the drugs if a positive surplus cannot be achieved).
3. Each patient is prescribed a drug from the available choice set (or no prescription if drug
treatment does not yield a positive utility).
We will consider two di¤erent versions of this game, where the payment scheme is either based
on uniform pricing (fi = 0) or two-part tari¤s (fi > 0). As usual, the game is solved by backwards
induction to nd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3 Monopoly
We start out by considering the case of a monopoly market, where only one drug exists. Alter-
natively, we can interpret this case as the quality di¤erence between the two drugs being so large
that therapeutic competition is infeasible, e¤ectively turning the market into monopoly for the
high-quality drug. Given that the existing (high-quality) drug is located at one of the endpoints of
the unit line, and assuming that the drug is prescribed to all patients for which the utility given








The monopoly version of the game described towards the end of the last section is simply that the
producer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er which the purchaser can either accept or reject. Thus,
6To ease notation, we drop the subscript i in the monopoly case.
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the monopoly producers problem is to maximise prots under the constraint that the purchasers
surplus, which in this case is given by (3), is non-negative. In the following we will solve this
maximisation problem under two di¤erent assumptions about the price o¤er, namely that (i) the
producer o¤ers a uniform price (p), or (ii) the producer o¤ers a two-part tari¤ (p; f).
3.1 Uniform pricing
Given that the drug is included in the health plan, the prot-maximising price is either an interior
solution where y < 1, or a corner solution where the price is set such that the prescribing physician
is indi¤erent between prescribing or not the drug to the patient with the lowest health benet; i.e.,
u (1) = 0. The producers choice of whether to implement an interior solution or not depends gen-
erally on the quality of the drug and on the price sensitivity of the prescription decision. However,
inclusion in the health plan is not guaranteed at any price. The producer is therefore also con-
strained by the condition that the o¤ered price must give the health plan a non-negative surplus.
If this condition binds, the prot-maximising price is implicitly given by S = 0, where S is dened
by (3) for f = 0.
When considering both types of potential corner solutions, stemming from the prescription
decisions and from the participation constraint of the purchaser, it can be shown (see Appendix A




2 if v  2t+ c and  > 
;
v
2  if v  2t+ c and 
 <   ;
v t
 if v > 2t+ c and  > 
;
v   t2 if   
;
(8)
where 12 < 




2t if v  2t+ c and  > 
;
2(1 )v
(2 )t if v  2t+ c and 
 <   ;
1 if v > 2t+ c or   :
(9)
Given that the drug is included in the health plan, the prot-maximising price is an interior
solution, in which not all patients are prescribed the drug, if the drug quality is su¢ ciently low
7We use superscript M to denote equilibrium values under monopoly.
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(v < 2t + c). Intuitively, the scope for such an interior solution is larger if drug demand is
more price sensitive or if mismatch costs are larger. However, unless demand is su¢ ciently price
sensitive, the unconstrained price will be too high to yield a non-negative surplus for the health
plan. In this case, which occurs if   , the optimal price must be adjusted downwards in order
to satisfy the participation constraint of the purchaser. Such a corner solution can imply either
partial or full market coverage, with full coverage occurring if  is su¢ ciently low (  ). Thus,
the monopoly solution under uniform pricing implies full market coverage if (i) the quality of the
drug is su¢ ciently high (v > 2t + c), or if (ii) the price sensitivity of demand is su¢ ciently low
(  ). If neither of these two conditions are met, the monopoly solution implies partial market
coverage.




4t if v  2t+ c and  > 

2v(1 )(v (2 )c)
t(2 )2 if v  2t+ c and 
 <   
v t
   c if v > 2t+ c and  > 








8t if v  2t+ c and  > 

0 if v  2t+ c and  <   
(2 )t 2(1 )v
2 if v > 2t+ c and  > 

0 if   
: (11)
Consistent with the above discussion of the producers optimal pricing incentives, we see that the
monopoly solution leaves the health plan with zero surplus if the price sensitivity of drug demand is
su¢ ciently low, such that the participation constraint of the purchaser binds (this case includes two
regimes, where the market is either partially or fully covered). Thus, complete surplus extraction
through uniform pricing might happen only if the health plans cost of purchasing the drug is not
fully internalised by the prescribing physician (i.e., if  < 1), making drug demand less price elastic.
On the other hand, if the purchasing cost is fully internalised ( = 1), we obtain the standard result
that the monopolists prots are maximised at a price that leaves the purchaser with a positive
surplus, regardless of whether this price yields an interior solution (yM < 1) or not (yM = 1).8
8Notice that full market coverage (yM = 1) does not necessarily imply full surplus extraction (SM = 0), nor does
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We summarise the above analysis as follows:
Proposition 1 Under monopoly with uniform pricing, (i) the market is fully covered if the quality
of the drug is su¢ ciently high or if the price sensitivity of demand is su¢ ciently low. Otherwise,
the market is partially covered. (ii) If the price sensitivity of drug demand is su¢ ciently low, the
health plan is left with zero surplus.
3.2 Two-part tari¤s
With two-part tari¤s, the producer can extract the purchasers entire surplus through the xed fee
f . From (3), this implies that, for any unit price p, the optimal xed fee is given by
f =





The producers prots can therefore be expressed as
 = (p  c) y +










For a given demand, a reduction in the unit price increases the health plans surplus by the same
amount as it reduces the rms prots, implying that the prot loss of a unit price reduction can
be fully recaptured by increasing the xed fee. Thus, with two-part tari¤s, the unit price a¤ects
prots only to the extent that it a¤ects total demand, and it is optimally set to induce the level
of demand that maximises the health plans surplus. This demand level is clearly y = 1, given
the assumption that the health benets net of production costs are positive for all patients, i.e.,
v > c+ t. Thus, the maximum prot under two-part tari¤s is therefore
bM = v   c  t
2
; (14)
which is independent of the unit price p as long as this price is low enough to induce a fully covered
market. The characterisation of the optimal two-part tari¤ follows straightforwardly:
Proposition 2 Under monopoly with two-part tari¤s, there is a continuum of payo¤-equivalent
contracts characterised by
bpM  v   t

(15)
partial market coverage (yM < 1) necessarily imply that the purchaser is left with a positive surplus (SM > 0).
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and bfM = v   bpM   t
2
: (16)
For any of these contracts, the producers prots are given by (14) and the purchasers surplus is
zero.
Let us now compare the outcomes under the two di¤erent payment schemes. Whereas a socially
e¢ cient outcome (i.e., y = 1) is always guaranteed with a two-part tari¤, uniform pricing produces
an e¢ cient outcome only if the drug quality is su¢ ciently high or if the price responsiveness of
drug demand is su¢ ciently low. However, from the viewpoint of the purchaser, uniform pricing is
strictly preferred to a two-part tari¤ if  is su¢ ciently high. Even if uniform pricing yields a worse
health outcome, in the sense that some patients are not given the drug treatment because of an
excessively high unit price, the additional health benets obtained by the use of a two-part tari¤
are lower than the corresponding increase in total drug payments.
The producer, on the other hand, is obviously at least as well o¤with a two-part tari¤, since this
type of payment contract provides an additional instrument to extract surplus from the purchaser.
However, if the price responsiveness of drug demand is su¢ ciently low,  < , both the producer
and the purchaser are indi¤erent between the two payment schemes.
The gains and losses from the two payment schemes under monopoly can be characterised as
follows:
Proposition 3 In case of monopoly, two-part tari¤s yield weakly higher producer prots, health
benets and total welfare, but a weakly lower surplus for the health plan, than uniform pricing.
4 Therapeutic competition
Consider now the case where two therapeutically substitutable drugs exist (or, alternatively, that
the quality di¤erence between the two drugs is su¢ ciently low to make therapeutic competition
feasible). If both drugs are included in the health plan, and if prescription choices are made to









i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j, where v := vi   vj is the quality di¤erence and p := pi   pj is the price
di¤erence between drug i and drug j. An interior solution with positive demand for both drugs
requires that v < p+ t.
In the following we will once more consider the two cases of uniform pricing and two-part
tari¤s, now solving the full game outlined in Section 2 with price competition between the two
drug producers at the rst stage of the game. Throughout the analysis we assume that the drug
qualities are su¢ ciently high to make therapeutic competition viable, implying that the market is
fully covered in equilibrium.
4.1 Uniform pricing
Suppose that the payment contracts are linear, such that fi = 0, i = 1; 2. Consider rst the
decision made by the purchaser at the second stage of the game. Suppose that pi and pj are such
that Si  Sj  0, implying that it is always optimal to include at least drug i in the health plan.
In this case, by substituting (17) into (3)-(5) and setting fi = 0 for i = 1; 2, we nd that both drugs
will be included if
S12   Si =
((2  )p+ t v) (p+ t v)
4t
 0; (18)
which is true for v < p+ t. Thus, if pi and pj are such that both drugs have positive demand if
they belong to the available prescription choice set, including the second drug will always increase
the surplus of the health plan, since utility is increased for the patients who are prescribed the
second drug.
We now turn to the rst stage of the game, where each producer sets a uniform price under the
anticipation that both drugs will be included in the health plan. By substituting (17) into (2) and











As expected, the prices are strategic complements. A higher price set by producer j shifts demand







towards drug i, which consequently makes the demand for drug i less price elastic, and producer i
optimally responds by increasing the price.





















We see that Assumption A2 ensures yi > 0 for i = 1; 2. The remaining properties of this equilib-
rium are straightforward and intuitive. The price level of each drug is increasing in the marginal
production cost and in the quality of the drug, while decreasing in the degree of therapeutic substi-
tutability and in the price responsiveness of demand. Furthermore, the producer of the high-quality
drug charges the higher price.
The above derived equilibrium outcome ensures that the condition in (18) is satised, which
implies that either both or no drugs will be included in the health plan. If both drugs are included,





implying Di > 
D
j if v > 0. The total health benet in this equilibrium is given by







and the total surplus of the health plan is
SD12 = v   c 
(4 + ) t
4

















11We use superscript D (for duopoly) to denote equilibrium values under therapeutic competition.
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where v := (v1 + v2) =2 is the average drug quality. The nal condition needed for both drugs to
be included in the health plan is that SD12  0, which requires that the quality of each drug is
su¢ ciently high (see Appendix B for a derivation of a specic su¢ cient condition for SD12  0). We
assume that this condition is satised.
4.2 Two-part tari¤s
Suppose now that each of the drug producers bids a unit price pi and a xed fee fi at the rst stage
of the game. Similarly to the monopoly case, this means that, for each producer, the additional
surplus created by making drug i available at price pi can be captured by the xed fee fi. However,
this surplus extraction is conditional on the drug being included in the health plan. As we will show
below, there are two di¤erent competition regimes arising under two-part tari¤s, one in which both
drugs are included in the plan, leading to de facto therapeutic competition, and one in which only
one of the drugs is included, leading to a situation of potential therapeutic competition, where the
non-included drug places a competitive pressure on the included one. The third possible outcome,
where therapeutic competition is blockaded in the sense that it is not protable for a rival with
a therapeutic substitute to submit a bid (due to large quality di¤erences), is captured by the
monopoly case in the previous section.
4.2.1 De facto therapeutic competition
Suppose that drug j is included in the health plan. In this case, drug i will also be included if
S12  Sj . By substituting (17) into (3)-(5), the inclusion criterion for drug i is given by
v   p  t
4
+
(v   p) (v   (2  )p)
4t
  fi   fj  vj   pj  
t
2
  fj ; (26)
where p := (p1 + p2) =2 is the average unit price. This condition can be re-formulated as
fi  bfi := (t+v   (2  )p) (t+v   p)
4t
: (27)
Since a higher fi implies a non-distortionary transfer from the buyer to the seller, the inequality in
(27) will bind in equilibrium. Thus, given that drug j is included in the health plan, the producer
of drug i can extract the additional surplus created by its inclusion through the xed fee.
Setting fi = bfi in the prot function of producer i and maximising (2) with respect to the unit
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(pi + (1  ) pj   c) = 0: (28)









pj ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (29)
There are two important observations that can be made here. First, we see that the nature of
strategic interaction is fundamentally changed when the producers set two-part tari¤s. Contrary
to the case of uniform pricing, with two-part tari¤s the unit prices are strategic substitutes at the
price bidding stage (i.e., @pi=@pj < 0). In order to grasp the intuition behind this result, it is










Under two-part tari¤s, a price increase a¤ects variable prots ((pi   c) yi), as it does under uniform
pricing, but it also a¤ects the xed fee that the rm can charge. More precisely, a higher price for
drug i reduces the additional surplus generated by inclusion of the drug in the health plan, thus
implying that the producer has to reduce the xed fee in order to ensure inclusion. How do these
marginal prot e¤ects depend on the price level of the competing drug j? An increase in pj shifts
demand from drug j to drug i, which implies that the demand for drug i becomes less price elastic.
All else equal, this increases the rst term in (30) and gives producer i an incentive to set a higher
price. This is the only strategic e¤ect under uniform pricing, leading to strategic complementarity
between the prices. However, under two-part tari¤s, the price of drug j also a¤ects the magnitude
of the second term in (30), which can be written as
@ bfi
@pi
= (2tyi   (1  )p)
@yi
@pi
  (1  ) yi < 0: (31)
Consider again an increase in pj , which leads to higher demand for drug i (i.e., @yi=@pj > 0). This








demand increase implies that a marginal price increase for drug i will now a¤ect a larger number of
patients and therefore lead to a larger reduction in the additional surplus created by the inclusion
of drug i in the health plan, leading in turn to a larger drop in the maximum xed fee that producer
i can charge. All else equal, this gives producer i an incentive to reduce the unit price. It turns out
that the negative e¤ect of pj on the second term in (30) outweighs the positive e¤ect on the rst
term, leading to strategic substitutability between the unit prices set by the two producers.
The second important observation we can make from the set of best-response functions, (29), is
that they are completely symmetric and thus not dependent on the quality di¤erence between the
two drugs. This implies that the Nash equilibrium is also symmetric in terms of unit prices (but
not in terms of xed fees), and given by marginal cost pricing for both producers:13
bpDi = c; i = 1; 2: (32)
The intuition follows from the explanation for strategic substitutability, as outlined above. For any
pair of unit prices higher than marginal cost, an increase in variable prots due to a higher price
is more than o¤set by a reduction in the xed fee, regardless of the quality di¤erences between
the drugs, thus implying that neither of the drug producers have any incentives to set their unit
prices above marginal cost. This means that prots are fully extracted through the xed fees.
Equilibrium prots (and xed fees) are therefore given by
bDi = bfDi = (t+v)24t ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j; (33)
implying that the high-quality producer charges a higher fee and consequently earns a higher prot
in equilibrium.
With marginal cost pricing, equilibrium demand is given by
byDi = 12 + v2t ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (34)
An interior solution therefore requires that the drug quality di¤erence is su¢ ciently low: v < t.











2 (2   1)
4t2
> 0;
which holds for  > 1=2.
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Notice that this is not guaranteed for all parameter congurations covered by Assumption A2.
Under the condition that v < t, both drugs will be included in the health plan, and the total
health benets are bHD12 = v   t4 + (v)24t ; (35)
whereas the total surplus of the health plan is
bSD12 = v   c  3t4   (v)24t : (36)
It is easily conrmed that bSD12 > 0 for all parameter values satisfying Assumption A1.
4.2.2 Potential therapeutic competition
Consider now the case of t < v < 3t, for which de facto therapeutic competition is not feasible,
since the quality di¤erence is too large for the low-quality drug to obtain positive demand, given
the contract o¤ered by the high-quality producer in the candidate equilibrium. However, this does
not allow the high-quality producer to extract all surplus with a two-part tari¤, as in the monopoly
case, because the purchaser can credibly threaten to replace the high-quality drug with the low-
quality drug in the health plan. Thus, if drug i is the high-quality drug, the bid submitted by
producer i is constrained by the condition that the health plans surplus obtained by including only
drug i must be at least as high as the surplus obtained if drug i is replaced by drug j in the health
plan. Under the assumption of full market coverage, this condition is given by
vi   pi  
t
2
  fi  vj   pj  
t
2
  fj ; (37)
which, using our previously dened notation, can be re-written as
fi  v  p+ fj : (38)
All else equal, the most protable contract o¤er for each producer is a contract that maximises
total surplus and extracts prots only through the xed fee, which implies that the unit price is
set equal to marginal cost. This implies that the optimal contract o¤er by producer i is a contract
given by pi = c and fi, where fi is just low enough to make the condition in (37) hold for all weakly
protable contract o¤ers by producer j. In the latter set of contracts, the one that maximises the
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surplus of the health plan is a contract with pj = c and fj = 0. Based on (38), this implies that
the optimal contract o¤er by producer i has fi = v.
Thus, for t < v < 3t, only the high-quality drug is included in the health plan, and the
equilibrium two-part tari¤ is given by14
bpdi = c and bfdi = v: (39)
Equilibrium prots, total health benet and total surplus for the health plan are given by, respec-
tively,
bdi = v; (40)
bHdi = vi   t2 (41)
and bSdi = vi   c  t2  v = vj   c  t2 > 0: (42)
Thus, the equilibrium prots of the high-quality producer are given by the quality di¤erence between
the two drugs, whereas the equilibrium surplus of the health plan is given by the maximum value of
the purchasers outside option, i.e., the maximum surplus that can be obtained by replacing drug
i by drug j in the health plan.
The next proposition summarises some of the main insights from the analysis in this section.
Proposition 4 Suppose there are two therapeutically substitutable drugs that are candidates for
inclusion in the health plan. (i) Under uniform pricing, both drugs are included for all v < 3t.
(ii) Under two-part tari¤s, both drugs are included if the drug quality di¤erence is su¢ ciently low,
v < t, whereas only the high-quality drug is included if t  v < 3t. Whether one or both drugs
are included in the health plan, the equilibrium two-part tari¤s have unit prices equal to marginal
cost.
4.3 Comparison of payment contracts under therapeutic competition
We conclude this section by comparing the equilibrium outcomes under the two di¤erent payment
contracts. Who gains and who loses from the use of two-part tari¤s instead of uniform pricing? The
answer to this question is summarised in the following proposition (see Appendix C for a proof):
14We use superscript d to denote equilibrium values under potential therapeutic competition.
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Proposition 5 (i) Under de facto therapeutic competition (v < t), the surplus of the health plan
is always higher with two-part tari¤s than with uniform pricing. The same is true under potential
therapeutic competition (t  v < 3t), unless the drug quality di¤erence and the price sensitivity
of demand are both su¢ ciently high.
(ii) The prot of the low-quality producer is always higher with uniform pricing than with two-
part tari¤s, regardless of whether there is de facto or potential competition. The same is true for
the prot of the high-quality producer, if the price sensitivity of demand is su¢ ciently low. On the
other hand, if demand is su¢ ciently price sensitive, the prot of the high-quality producer is higher
with two-part tari¤s under de facto competition if the quality di¤erence is su¢ ciently large, and it
is always higher with two-part tari¤s under potential competition.
(iii) The total health benet (and thus total welfare) is always higher with two-part tari¤s,
regardless of whether there is de facto or potential competition.
The impact of therapeutic competition on the purchasers preference ranking of the two payment
schemes is quite striking. In complete contrast to the monopoly case, in which the monopoly
supplier is able to extract all surplus by using a two-part tari¤, the health plan obtains a higher
surplus under therapeutic competition if the drug payments are based on two-part tari¤s instead
of uniform pricing. The only exception is the case in which the quality di¤erence is high and drug
demand is sensitive to price changes.
There are two di¤erent reasons why two-part tari¤s are generally preferable to uniform pricing
from the viewpoint of the purchaser. First, with therapeutic competition between drug suppliers,
each supplier is only able to extract the additional surplus created by the inclusion of its drug in
the health plan. The purchasers credible threat of excluding one of the drugs from the health plan
implies that the producerssurplus extraction is lower than in the case of a monopoly producer.
Thus, competition for access between the two producers ensures that a larger share of the surplus
is captured by the purchaser. The second reason is that the use of two-part tari¤s eliminates an
allocational ine¢ ciency that is present under uniform pricing, thereby creating a larger surplus. If
the two producers compete by setting uniform prices, the high-quality producer exploits its demand
advantage by setting a higher price than the low-quality producer. This creates an allocative
ine¢ ciency where some patients would have been better o¤ being treated with the high-quality
drug, but are instead being prescribed the low-quality drug because it is less expensive. In other
words, too few patients are being prescribed the high-quality drug under uniform pricing. This
20
ine¢ ciency is eliminated under two-part tari¤s, because of the producers incentives to set unit
prices equal to marginal cost, regardless of drug quality di¤erences.
The allocative ine¢ ciency caused by uniform pricing explains why the total health benets are
always higher under two-part tari¤s. This is also true under potential therapeutic competition,
even if the use of two-part tari¤s instead of uniform pricing in this case implies a reduction in the
prescription choice set from two to one drugs. However, remember that this case arises for v > t,
which implies that all patients in the market obtains a higher health benet if they are treated by
the high-quality drug. This illustrates again the allocative ine¢ ciency related to uniform pricing.
For v 2 (t; 3t), some patients are treated with the therapeutically less appropriate drug under
uniform pricing because of the price di¤erence caused by this payment scheme.
Since the purchaser generally prefers two-part tari¤s under therapeutic competition, the pro-
ducers tend to prefer uniform pricing, again in contrast to the monopoly case. However, while this
is always the case for the low-quality producer, the high-quality producer might also prefer two-part
tari¤s if demand is su¢ ciently price sensitive and if the quality di¤erence is su¢ ciently large. The
partially aligned interests of the purchaser and the high-quality producer can be explained by the
above mentioned e¢ ciency gain from using two-part tari¤s, which increases in the quality di¤erence
between the drugs.
Overall, our analysis shows how the presence (or not) of therapeutic competition is of crucial
importance for identifying the winners and losers from the two di¤erent payment schemes under
consideration. Although the use of two-part tari¤s always maximises the total surplus, and there-
fore also maximises total health benets, the distribution of this surplus depends crucially on the
competition regime. Under monopoly, a switch from uniform pricing to two-part tari¤s gener-
ally benets drug producers at the expense of drug purchasers. In the presence of therapeutic
competition, the opposite tends to be the case.
5 Exclusive contracting
In this section we extend our analysis of therapeutic competition by considering an alternative
version of the game, where the two producers compete for an exclusive contract with the health
plan. This implies a modication of the rules at stage two of the game outlined in Section 2,
where we now assume that the purchaser only includes the drug that yields the highest surplus for
the health plan. Thus, drug i will obtain exclusivity if Si  Sj . Clearly, this condition holds in
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equilibrium only if drug i is the high-quality drug, i.e., if vi  vj . In this case, the producer of drug
i can obtain exclusivity by making a bid that outperforms all protable bids by the producer of
drug j. The unique Nash equilibrium is then that producer j makes a bid that yields zero prots
if the bid is accepted, while producer i makes a bid that is marginally more favourable for the
health plan. Assuming a tie-breaking rule where producer i wins the contest if both bids yield
equal surplus for the health plan, the equilibrium bid by producer i is implicitly given by
Si = Sj jj=0 : (43)
If the two producers compete for exclusivity by using two-part tari¤s, the game is identical to
the one described under potential therapeutic competition in Section 4.2.2, and the winning bid is
therefore given by (39), which gives the health plan a surplus given by (42). On the other hand, if
the producers compete in uniform prices, the bid that gives zero prots for producer j is pj = c.
Using (3)-(4), and assuming that vi is large enough to ensure full market coverage in equilibrium,
the equilibrium condition (43) under uniform pricing then becomes
vi   pi  
t
2




which implies that the winning bid is given by
pi = c+v: (45)
Since total demand is one, this gives producer i a prot of v, which is exactly the same as under
competition for exclusivity in two-part tari¤s. The surplus of the health plan is therefore also the
same, and given by (42). Thus:
Proposition 6 If the health plan o¤ers an exclusive contract, the equilibrium outcome is the same
regardless of whether the producers compete for the contract by uniform or two-part pricing. In
both cases, the high-quality producer wins the contract and obtains a prot equivalent to the quality
di¤erence between the drugs, while the health plan obtains a surplus equal to the maximum value of
its outside option.
Would the health plan benet from o¤ering an exclusive contract? And would such a contract
lead to a better or worse health outcome for patients? The answers to these questions are not
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a priori obvious, because exclusive contracting will generally a¤ect both the purchasing costs,
through changes in the degree of competition between the producers, and the total health gain,
through changes in mismatch costs. By making the relevant comparisons of health gains and
purchaser surplus with and without contract exclusivity, we arrive at the following conclusions
(proof in Appendix C):
Proposition 7 (i) If drug payment is based on two-part tari¤s, and if v < t, o¤ering an exclusive
contract always yields a lower total health benet but a higher surplus for the health plan. For
v 2 [t; 3t), exclusive contracting has no implications for the equilibrium outcome under two-part
pricing.
(ii) If drug payment is instead based on uniform pricing, non-exclusivity yields a higher sur-
plus for the health plan if demand is su¢ ciently price sensitive and the drug quality di¤erence is
su¢ ciently large. Otherwise, the health plan would be better o¤ by o¤ering an exclusive contract.
The total health benet is higher (lower) with exclusive contracting if the drug quality di¤erence is
su¢ ciently large (small).
With two-part pricing, there are two counteracting e¤ects. On the one hand, since competi-
tion on the market yields marginal cost pricing and therefore no allocative ine¢ ciencies, exclusive
contracting always leads to higher mismatch costs and therefore lower total health gains, because
patients lose access to a valuable therapeutic substitute. On the other hand, letting the producers
compete for an exclusive contract always intensies the competition between them (as long as de
facto therapeutic competition would ensue if both drugs are included in the plan) and therefore
allows the health plan to reduce its purchasing costs. Perhaps surprisingly, the pro-competitive
e¤ect of exclusive contracting dominates for the entire (relevant) range of parameters. Although
exclusivity leads to a worse health outcome, this is more than outweighed by a reduction in pur-
chasing costs. In order to understand this result, notice that what increases the health loss of
exclusive contracting also increases the amount of purchasing costs that can be saved by letting the
producers compete for exclusivity. Consider an increase in the mismatch cost parameter t. This
increases the health loss of excluding one of the drugs from the market, all else equal. However, a
higher t also reduces competition between the producers on the market if both drugs are included
in the health plan. Since the exclusive contract equilibrium does not depend on t, higher mismatch
costs therefore increase the pro-competitive e¤ect of contract exclusivity.
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With uniform pricing, the e¤ects are more complicated. In this case, exclusive contracting can
lead to either higher or lower health gains, and also higher or lower purchasing costs. The direction
of both e¤ects depends crucially on the quality di¤erence between the two drugs. Consider rst
the e¤ect on health gains. Since a larger quality di¤erence increases the share of patients who are
better o¤ with the high-quality drug, the additional health benet of having access to a second
(lower-quality) drug is reduced. Furthermore, and in contrast to the case of two-part pricing, the
allocative ine¢ ciency created by uniform pricing (as discussed in Section 4.3) implies that, if the
quality di¤erence is su¢ ciently large, the total health gain is higher if only the high-quality drug
is included in the health plan. Thus, exclusive contracting leads to an overall increase in health
benets for a su¢ ciently large quality di¤erence between the drugs.15 Consider next the e¤ect of
exclusive contracting on total purchasing costs. Once more, this e¤ect depends crucially on the drug
quality di¤erence. Although a higher quality di¤erence dampens the degree of competition on the
market if both drugs are included, it leads to an even stronger reduction in the competition for an
exclusive contract and, importantly, this di¤erence is larger the more price sensitive drug demand
is.16 In fact, for su¢ ciently price sensitive demand and a su¢ ciently large quality di¤erence,
the purchasing costs are higher with exclusive contracting than under non-exclusivity. Overall,
it turns out that, for su¢ ciently low quality di¤erences, the negative health e¤ect of exclusive
contracting is more than outweighed by the reduction in purchasing costs, leading to an increase
in the health plans surplus. However, for su¢ ciently high quality di¤erences, and if in addition
demand is su¢ ciently price sensitive, the positive health e¤ect of exclusive contracting is more than
outweighed by the increase in purchasing costs, leading to a reduction in the surplus of the health
plan.17
The possibility of o¤ering exclusive contracts has interesting implications for the relative merits
of uniform versus two-part pricing from the health plans point of view. From Proposition 7 we
know that the health plan always (weakly) prefers contract exclusivity under two-part pricing, but
15An increase in patients health benets as a result of exclusive contracting occurs if v > 3
5
t. This implies






, in which having access to only the high-quality drug yields
higher health benets than having access to both drugs at distorted prices, even if the total health benets would be
maximised with a strictly positive share of patients being prescribed the low-quality drug. In other words, since too
many patients are prescribed the low-quality drug under non-exclusivity with uniform pricing, total health benets
would increase by removing access to the low-quality drug.
16Notice that while more price sensitive demand (i.e., a higher ) intensies price competition in the market
duopoly, the exclusive contract equilibrium is una¤ected by the price sensitivity of demand.
17The parameter space for which contract exclusivity leads to a lower surplus for the health plan under uniform
pricing coincides with the parameter space in which the purchaser, under non-exclusivity, prefers uniform over two-
part pricing. From Proposition 5 we know that this parameter space is a subset of v 2 (t; 3t).
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from Proposition 6 we know that, under contract exclusivity, the health plan is indi¤erent between
uniform pricing and two-part tari¤s. In other words, any benet from exclusive contracting for the
health plan can just as well be obtained using uniform pricing, which has the following immediate
implication:
Corollary 1 If o¤ering exclusive contracts is a possibility, the health plan will always weakly prefer
uniform pricing over two-part tari¤s.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied the e¤ects of adopting a new payment scheme (the Netix model) for
pharmaceuticals in a setup where drug producers submit bids to a purchaser for being included in
the health plan. In particular, we have analysed distributional e¤ects (who gains and who loses) of
switching from a traditional system with uniform pricing to a new payment scheme with two-part
pricing, where the health plan pays an access (subscription) fee in addition to a low unit price
(equal to marginal costs). A key insight from our analysis is that the e¤ects of two-part pricing
crucially depend on whether or not there is competition in the relevant therapeutic market. If a
drug producer is a monopolist (i.e., there exists no viable therapeutic alternatives), two-part pricing
is benecial for the drug producer but not for the health plan, because it enables the monopolist
to extract all of the surplus from the health plan. However, this result is reversed if there is
competition among drug producers in the therapeutic market. In this case, the drug producers
compete more aggressively under two-part pricing than uniform pricing for being included in the
health plan. Two-part pricing benets the health plan in two ways; it improves allocative e¢ ciency
(unit prices equal to marginal costs) and lowers drug expenditures (intensied competition). This
conclusion relies, however, on the assumption of non-exclusivity, meaning that health plan will
include all drugs that contributes positively to the health plans surplus. If we also open up for
the possibility of exclusive contracting, where only one drug is included in the plan, then uniform
pricing is always weakly preferred by drug purchaser.
While the paper employs a duopoly Hotelling model to study the e¤ects of two-part pricing, the
results hold more generally. Allowing for more (than two) drug companies will make competition
more intense and thus reduce the distortions in consumption under uniform prices due to prices
above marginal costs. However, this generalisation will not change our results in qualitative terms;
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neither the comparison of monopoly versus competition nor the comparison of uniform versus two-
part pricing under competition. The same is true for a more general demand structure under
standard assumptions. The key results depend on whether the health plan has an outside option
when deciding on the inclusion, and to what extent two-part pricing results in marginal cost pricing.
By way of conclusion, we would like to point at some limitations of our study. First, our
analysis has not accounted for possible externalities across markets of adopting two-part pricing.
In the presence of parallel trade, drug producers may be reluctant to o¤er unit prices at marginal
costs, as this may result in parallel export to countries with higher, uniform prices. A similar type
of spillover may occur across health plans. If prices are public information, then drug producers
may be reluctant to o¤er unit prices equal to marginal costs under two-part pricing, as this may
have a negative impact on the price-setting to other health plans (using uniform pricing). Such
cross-market externalities can reduce the scope for two-part pricing.
Second, our analysis has not considered how drug producersinnovation incentives are a¤ected
by the choice of payment scheme, but can shed some light on this question. On the one hand, two-
part pricing results in lower prots to the drug producers due to intensied competition, especially
when the quality di¤erence between the therapeutic alternatives are not too large. This result
points in the direction of lower patent rent due to two-part pricing. On the other hand, drug
producers obtain higher prots under two-part pricing in the case of a monopoly position in the
therapeutic market. This result points in the direction of higher patent rent if the drug producer
has developed a signicantly better product than its rivals. Thus, two-part pricing may stimulate
drug producers to spend less resources on marginal (me-too) innovations and more resources on
radical (disruptive) innovations.
Third, we model physiciansprescription choices in a highly reduced form. In practice, physi-
ciansprescription choices are likely to be a¤ected by many factors, including their contract with
the health plan, remuneration schemes, the competitive environment, marketing by drug compa-
nies, etc. We have reduced these circumstances to a single parameter (), measuring the weight
that the physician puts on patientshealth benets relative to the price of the drug. While we
believe this is a key element of physiciansprescription choices, a more careful analysis of physician
behaviour is needed to fully understand the e¤ects of di¤erent payment schemes. However, this is
beyond the scope of the current paper, and we leave this issue, as well as innovation incentives and
cross-market spillovers, to future research.
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Appendix
A. Optimal uniform pricing under monopoly
Suppose that the drug is included in the health plan (i.e., that the participation constraint of
the purchaser holds). Substituting the demand function, (7), into the prot function, (2), and




2 if v  2t+ c
v t
 if v > 2t+ c
; (A1)
where y < (=) 1 if v < () 2t+ c.
The next step is to check what is required for the purchasers participation constraint to hold.
From (3), under uniform pricing, this constraint is given by
S =

v   p  ty
2

y  0: (A2)
Consider rst the case of v < 2t + c, for which unconstrained monopoly pricing yields p =
(v + c) =2 and y = (v   c) =2t, so (A2) becomes
S = (v (3   2)  (2  )c) (v   c)
8t
 0: (A3)









If  is below this threshold level, the drug producers price setting is constrained by the condition
that the health plans surplus must be non-negative. In this case, the optimal (constrained) price
solves 
v   p  ty
2

y = 0; (A5)
where y is either an interior solution given by y = (v   p) =t, or a corner solution given by y = 1.
The optimal (constrained) price that implements an interior solution is therefore given by
p =
v
2   ; (A6)
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whereas the price that implements a corner solution is
p = v   t
2
: (A7)
By a simple comparison of prots, we nd that the optimal price is given by (A6) if  >  and
by (A7) if  < , where
 :=
2 (v   t)
2v   t : (A8)
Consider now the case of v > 2t + c, which implies a fully covered market in the prot-
maximising solution. Setting p = (v   t) = and y = 1 in (A2), the purchasers participation
constraint is given by
S =
t (2  )  2 (1  ) v
2
 0: (A9)
This constraint holds if   . On the contrary, if  < , the producer must o¤er the purchaser
a lower price. In this case, we have already found that the highest price that the purchaser is willing
to accept is the price given by (A7). This completes all the relevant regimes and the monopoly
solution under uniform pricing is fully characterised by (8).
B. Equilibrium existence under therapeutic competition with uniform pricing
The Nash equilibrium given by (20) exists if the surplus of the health plan, SD12, is non-negative.










> 0 for v < 3t: (B1)
Thus, for a given value of vj , SD12 is monotonically increasing in vi, which implies that the scope








It follows that a su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for SD12  0 is






Proof of Proposition 5
Let drug i be the high-quality drug and drug j the low-quality drug, implying v > 0.
(i) Consider rst the case of de facto therapeutic competition, which requires v < t. From
(25) and (36), a comparison of the health plan surplus under uniform pricing and two-part tari¤s
yields
SD12   bSD12 = (7   2) (v)2   (2  ) 9t218t : (C1)
The sign of (C1) depends on the sign of the numerator, which is monotonically increasing in v.
Setting v at the upper bound, v = t, the numerator reduces to  4t2 (5  4) < 0. Thus,
SD12 <
bSD12 for all v < t.
Consider next the case of potential therapeutic competition, which requires v 2 (t; 3t). From
(25) and (42), a similar health plan surplus comparison yields
SD12   bSdi = 9t ((2v + t)   4t) + (5   4) (v)236t : (C2)
The sign of (C2) depends on the sign of the numerator, which we dene as A, where
@A
@
= (3t+v) (3t+ 5v) > 0; (C3)







3t (7t  2v) + (v)2

< 0 for v 2 (t; 3t) : (C4)
Evaluating A at the upper bound of  yields
Aj=1 = 9t (2v   3t) + (v)
2 ; (C5)
which is monotonically increasing in v. It is easily veried that Aj=1 < 0 for v = t and
Aj=1 > 0 for v = 3t. Thus, A > 0, implying SD12 > bSdi if both  and v are su¢ ciently high.
Otherwise, SD12 < bSdi .
(ii) Consider rst the case of de facto therapeutic competition, which requires v < t. From
(23) and (33), a comparison of prots under uniform pricing and two-part tari¤s for the high-quality
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producer yields
Di   bDi = 9t2 (2  ) v ((9   2)v   6t (2  3))36t : (C6)
The sign of (C6) is given by the sign of the numerator, which we dene as B, where
@B
@
=  9 (t+v)2 < 0; (C7)







(3t v) (9t+ 5v) > 0 for v < t: (C8)
Evaluating B at the upper bound of  yields
Bj=1 = 3t (3t  2v)  7 (v)
2 : (C9)
It is easily veried that Bj=1 > 0 if v is su¢ ciently close to zero, and Bj=1 < 0 if v is
su¢ ciently close to t. Thus, Di < bDi if  and v are both su¢ ciently high. Otherwise, Di > bDi .
A similar prot comparison for the low-quality producer yields
Dj   bDj = 9t2 (2  ) v ((9   2)v + 6t (2  3))36t : (C10)
The sign of (C10) depends on the sign of the numerator, which we dene as C, where
@C
@
=  9 (t v)2 < 0; (C11)
implying that the numerator is monotonically decreasing in . Evaluating C at the upper bound
of  yields
Cj=1 = v (6t  7v) + 9t
2 > 0 for v < t: (C12)
Thus, C > 0, implying Dj > bDj for all  2  12 ; 1 and v < t.
Consider next the case of potential therapeutic competition, which requires v 2 (t; 3t). In this
regime, the low-quality producer is included in the health plan under uniform pricing and excluded
from the health plan under two-part tari¤s, which obviously means that the prots are higher in
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the former case. From (23) and (40), a prot comparison for the high-quality producer yields
Di   bdi = 3t (3t  2v (3   1)) + (v)218t : (C13)












3t (3t v) + (v)2
9t
> 0 for v 2 (t; 3t) ; (C15)
while evaluating E at the upper bound of  yields
Ej=1 =
(v)2   3t (4v   3t)
18t
< 0 for v 2 (t; 3t) : (C16)
Thus, Di > (<) bdi if  is su¢ ciently low (high).
(iii) Consider rst the case of de facto therapeutic competition, which requires v < t. From
(24) and (35), a comparison of the total health benet under uniform pricing and two-part tari¤s
yields
HDi   bHDi =  (v)29t < 0: (C17)
For the case of potential competition, which requires v 2 (t; 3t), a similar comparison yields
HDi   bHdi = (3t  5v) (3t v)36t < 0 for v 2 (t; 3t) : (C18)
Proof of Proposition 7
(i) For v < t, the health benet of exclusive contracting when the producers use two-part tari¤s,
denoted by H, is given by a comparison of (41) and (35), yielding
















The e¤ect of exclusive contracting on the surplus of the health plan, denoted by S, is given by a
comparison of (42) and (36), yielding















For v 2 [t; 3t), the Nash equilibrium under exclusive contracting is identical to the Nash equilib-
rium under non-exclusivity (which is characterised by potential therapeutic competition). Contract
exclusivity is therefore irrelevant in this parameter range.
(ii) Under uniform pricing, the health benet of non-exclusivity (instead of exclusive contract-
ing) is given by (C18) in the proof of Proposition 5, where in this case the relevant parameter range
is v < 3t. It is straightforward to verify that this expression is positive (negative) if v < (>) 35 t.
Similarly, the e¤ect of non-exclusivity on the health plans surplus is given by (C2) in the proof
of Proposition 5, once more with the relevant parameter range being v < 3t. It is easily veried
that the condition for a positive (resp. negative) sign of this expression, which in the proof of
Proposition 5 is derived for v 2 [t; 3t), also extends to v < t. Thus, (C2) is positive if both 
and v are su¢ ciently high, and negative otherwise.
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